ISIS: Inside The Army Of Terror
Initially dismissed by US President Barack Obama, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has shocked the world by conquering massive territories in both countries and promising to create a vast new Muslim caliphate that observes the strict dictates of Sharia law. In ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, American journalist Michael Weiss and Syrian analyst Hassan Hassan explain how these violent extremists evolved from a nearly defeated Iraqi insurgent group into a jihadi army of international volunteers who have conquered territory equal to the size of Great Britain. Drawing on original interviews with former US military officials and current ISIS fighters, the authors also reveal the internecine struggles within the movement itself as well as ISIS’ bloody hatred of Shiite Muslims, which is generating another sectarian war in the region. Past is prologue, and America’s legacy in the Middle East is sowing a new generation of terror.

Book Information

Audible Audio Edition
Listening Length: 9 hours and 28 minutes
Program Type: Audiobook
Version: Unabridged
Publisher: Dreamscape Media, LLC
Audible.com Release Date: July 7, 2015
Language: English
ASIN: B011369JME

Customer Reviews

I agree with the other reviewers that this is very an interesting history of how ISIS developed and the role it has played in the Iraqi and Syrian wars. (The section on the Syrian war is downright Byzantine.) The reason I dropped one star is that this is really a piece of journalism, such as a multi-part New Yorker article, published separately with covers and rushed to print to meet a current need. The book is filled with names of people and organizations which unless you are a Middle East specialist don’t easily register with Americans. Most organizations are given a set of initials on first mention; after that they are referred to by those initials. As there is neither a table of these abbreviations nor an index, reading this can be a struggle. Because of this problem, I recommend
the Kindle version with its search function over the paperback I read. At least one general map of the region would have been very helpful in following the text. I chose not to carry around an atlas as I read this book. And finally, I would have liked more information on the actual structure of the organization and how it operates. But, perhaps that is beyond our current state of knowledge. As it is, the book is very useful in dispelling the idea that ISIS is run by Jihadi John and his ilk—or least, so I hope.

In ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan provide important and fascinating insights into the development of ISIS, many of its leaders, and its mass appeal to certain Sunni population groups. The book also raises some hard to substantiate issues about the potential roles of the Iranian and Syrian governments in assisting Sunni Islamic extremists combating U.S. forces in the period soon after the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. The authors note from the outset that Egyptian Ayman Al-Zawahiri of Al-Qaeda emphasized attacking the United States and other powerful non-Islamic states that opposed Islamic fundamentalist extremists and provided underlying support for what he viewed as corrupt governments in Islamic countries. Weiss and Hassan point out that in contrast Jordanian born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who played a major role in organizing Al Qaeda in Iraq (which eventually evolved into ISIS), believed that his targets should include those he considered proximate unbelievers including the Shia and non-fundamentalist Sunni political leaders and their supporters backed by the U.S. Weiss and Hassan suggest that multiple factors contributed to the creation and growth of ISIS including the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq in 2003, the anti-Baathist campaign and the dissolution of the Iraqi armed forces that resulted in mass unemployment of skilled military personnel many of whom later joined ISIS, the partisan Shia Maliki government’s policies that enraged and alienated many Iraqi Sunnis, and the lack of an effective military deterrent to the rise of ISIS. The authors suggest that in some areas plagued by lawlessness and corrupt local leaders, many people welcomed or at least tolerated ISIS because of its re-establishment of a type of stability and order, even if accompanied by brutal methods. As noted above, one of the areas that may be less satisfying in the book is the implication that the Syrian government and the Iranian government both at least temporarily supported Sunni extremists’ activities in Iraq following the March 2003 invasion. It seems more plausible that in Syria in particular certain persons believed to be attempting to resist foreign occupation were allowed to cross into Iraq. The authors’ sources in some cases may have imputed knowledge of the nature of the Sunni extremist threat to Syrian and Iranian government officials back in the first few years after the U.S. led invasion of Iraq that Western intelligence
agencies have only recently come to grasp. In other words, Syrians or Iranians in the chaotic period right after the invasion may have believed they were assisting Baathist resistance to the invasion rather than Sunni Salafists who would later turn on them as well as Western forces. Another element that might have been developed further in the book would have been an analysis of how the overall network of elite political, wealth and security interests in the Middle East and North Africa have inhibited democratic forces and provided an opening for a fanatical movement like ISIS. With popular perception that there is no other feasible way to counter what many see as a corrupt multinational system, ISIS has likely had some appeal as at least one option to in some way challenge the status quo. The international context may also help explain ISIS’s staying power.

With the recent announcement by Russia that they will be performing airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the world is seeing the newest combatant in a struggle that has its origins in events from decades prior. While the Islamic State first burst onto the scene in 2014 from seemingly nowhere, the terror group actually has its origins in a shifting coalition of Islamic militants who have been waiting all their lives for this moment. For the first time since the fall of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime in late 2001, an Islamic terrorist group has such control over a region that it could be regarded as a government. Borrowing heavily from prior journalism efforts, this book by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan performs an excellent job chronicling the rise of the Islamic State. Although he probably now seems like a distant memory, the closest thing the Islamic State has to a direct ancestor was the terrorist network of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. al-Zarqawi was a Jordanian who arrived too late to fight against the Soviets in the late 1980s, so he instead sought to overthrow those regimes throughout the Arab world that he viewed as apostates. His opportunity to shine came with the American invasion of Iraq. Although the motivations behind what drove the invasion have been part of an emotional debate, virtually no one contests that the dissolution of the Iraqi military and removal from office of most Ba’athist civil servants was a mistake. With these decisions, hundreds of thousands of men were suddenly unemployed and very angry. These men would become an important group once the Islamic State began to make its name. Before Islamic State, however, al-Zarqawi sought to establish a reign of terror with suicide bombings and beheadings throughout the country. Although he and Osama bin Laden had always kept one another at arm’s length, al-Zarqawi pursued the policy of many other terrorist groups and nominally kept his organization under al-Qaeda’s banner. By the time al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006, his terror network, despite going through a number of name changes, was well-enough established to survive past the American withdrawal at the end of 2011. Across the border in Syria,
President Bashar al-Assad had lent some support to insurgents attacking American military personnel throughout the occupation. However, like most Middle Eastern tyrants, he had an ambiguous relationship with Islamic militants. Fearful of them causing unrest at home, he pursued an alternating policy of throwing them in jail and exporting them to cause mischief in other countries. Once people began to protest against his regime, he turned against the protestors. These protestors, previously peaceful, turned to arms and the book posits that Bashar al-Assad may have released Islamic militants from jail, knowing they would join the opposition and thereby delegitimize it. As a result, these militants from both Syria and Iraq slowly coalesced into the organization now known as the Islamic State. The main goal of this group is to establish a return to the glories of the Islamic caliphate from a thousand years ago, and to rule over the whole of the Middle East and eventually the world. It was born from an unusual set of alliances and divisions. At the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the Islamic State sought to ally with more secular groups like the Free Syrian Army. Their radicalism and tendency to behead anyone who disagreed with them, however, quickly led to a rupture in the alliance. Added to that was Islamic State’s simultaneous feud with the official al-Qaeda militia in the Levant, al-Nusra Front. Despite being outnumbered and attacked on multiple sides, the Islamic State in mid-2014 gained ground in Syria and overwhelmed the Iraqi military in cities, such as Fallujah, Mosul, and Tikrit. Part of their success came from the experience of former members of Saddam Hussein’s military. While Saddam’s Ba’ath party may have been largely secular, its adherents decided that allying with an Islamic group and being in power was better than having no power at all. What confuses many Western readers is how an organization so brutal could gain such widespread appeal. I personally do not find it surprising at all. Civil wars have a tendency to escalate in brutality over time and many of this conflict’s commanders have been at war in one place or another for thirty years. More importantly, many of its fighters are young men and, although it would be an overstatement to say that this applies to most, many youth are dumb, unconcerned with death, and with an appetite for destruction. To the Middle East, though, their strongest appeal is claiming to have erased the borders established by the Sykes-Picot Agreement that were imposed in the aftermath of World War One. Although few people in the Western world have probably even heard of it, in the Middle East the history of one’s people is still a living presence. However, while many think that the Islamic State controls a solid block of territory, their control depends on the proximity of enemy troops and is often fluid. Overall, I found this to be an extremely educating book. In a region where it is frequently difficult to remember the names, let alone remember their political stance, this creates a clear narrative. One surprising aspect is the book’s depiction of the Islamic State’s current leader, Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi, as more of a bureaucrat than a fighter. Although he was known to intelligence operatives for years, he rose through the ranks as much through his superiors being killed as any particular talent or charisma. Its portrait for the Middle East is bleak, though. Realistically, the Free Syrian Army is not strong enough to defeat both the Islamic State and Bashar al-Assad, especially when the latter has the full-throated support of Iran and Russia. The United States, on the other hand, has been unwilling to put boots on the ground and instead has limited itself to airstrikes. Although airstrikes may be able to destroy many valuable targets, ultimately a group like the Islamic State has managed to survive the prior deaths of its leaders and is becoming increasingly adept at concealing its forces from aerial surveillance. Although this book covers the history of the Islamic State and its wars up to the beginning of this year, I believe a full history of the organization will have to cover many years to come.

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